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The most notable capital structure theories today are the traditional pecking order theory, trade-
off theory and market timing theory. The first two theories hypothesize a semi-strong efficiency in 
the capital markets, whereas the market timing theory sees the capital market more or less 
inefficient. Thus, market timing theory allows the idea of managerial persons to be able to time the 
market, i.e. issue debt when it is cheap and issue equity when it is cheap. This kind of opportunistic 
behavior is not allowed by the pecking order or the trade-off theory. But then, why do we witness 
fluctuations in the general securities issuance behavior in the market?  
The prior research has been focusing on explaining this behavior with ex post realized returns but 
it has been recognized by several studies (e.g., Froot & Frankel, 1989; Gebhardt, Lee, & 
Swaminathan, 2001; Hou, van Dijk, & Zhang, 2012) that such estimates are extremely noisy. Thus, 
I will be using a new, more robust measure for cost of capital named implied cost of capital (ICC) 
which equates the market value of equity and the forecasted future earnings of a given firm in a 
valuation model. In addition, I will be employing a firm-level ICC.  
My data is acquired for U.S. based publicly traded companies for each year from 1974 to 2013. 
Using financial statement data for a period of minimum six years, I compute my own earnings 
forecasts applying a regression model introduced by Hou, Van Dijk, and Zhang (2012) and Lee, So, 
and Wang (2010) as opposed to using analyst forecasts that can biased. After computing the 
forecasts, apply them to three separate valuation models, and solve for the required market return 
R (discount rate in the models) which represents the implied cost of capital. These three estimates 
are used to compute a synthetic implied cost of capital index with equal weights after which it is 
converted into implied equity risk premium by subtracting the real interest rate. 
As a result of my statistical models, I find that firm management follows the level of their firm 
specific cost of capital and make financing decisions based on this. This behaviour has become even 
more explicit during the last few years. However, they seem to follow the market-level cost of capital 
more closely. Changes in the tax rate and growth opportunities seem to also affect the financing 
behaviour which lends power to the traditional trade-off theory. When testing for the importance of 
the traditional pecking order theory, it seems to have lost most of its power to explain the securities 
issuance decisions after the late 1970s. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Merkittävimmät pääomarakenteeseen liittyvät teoriat ovat tänä päivänä pecking order -teoria, 
trade-off -teoria sekä market timing -teoria. Kaksi ensimmäistä teoriaa olettaa 
pääomamarkkinoiden olevan keskivahvasti tehokkaat, kun taas market timing – teorian mukaan 
pääomamarkkinat ovat enemmän tai vähemmän epätehokkaita. Tämän johdosta market timing–
teoria tukee ajatusta, että yrityksen johto pystyy ajoittamaan markkinan niin, että yritys hankkii 
velkarahoitusta sen ollessa halpaa ja oman pääoman ehtoista rahoitusta kun se on halpaa. Pecking 
order- tai trade-off–teoria eivät salli tämän kaltaista oletusta. Mutta miksi yritykset käyttävät 
erilaisia rahoitusmuotoja vaihtelevasti eri aikoina. 
Aikaisempi tutkimus on keskittynyt selittämään tätä käyttäytymistä soveltamalla ex post 
toteutuneita tuottoja, mutta useat tutkimukset (e.g., Froot & Frankel, 1989; Gebhardt et al., 2001; 
Hou et al., 2012) ovat osoittaneet näiden arvojen tuottavan epätarkkoja ennusteita. Tästä johtuen 
käytän tutkimuksessani tarkempaa mallia nimeltä implisiittinen pääoman kustannus (implied cost 
of capital, ICC), joka ratkaistuna asettaa yrityksen markkina-arvon ja tulevaisuuden kassavirrat 
arvostusmenetelmillä yhtä suuriksi. Lasken nämä arvot yrityskohtaisesti. 
Käyttämäni aineisto käsittää yhdysvaltalaiset pörssinoteeratut yritykset vuosina 1974-2013. 
Käyttäen apunani vähintään kuuden vuoden tilinpäätöslukuja, lasken jokaiselle yhtiölle omat 
tuottoennusteet regressiomallin avulla, jonka esittelivät Hon, Van Djik ja Zhang (2012) sekä Lee, So 
ja Wang (2010). Tuottoennusteiden avulla ratkaistaan kolmesta eri arvostusmallista markkinoilla 
vaadittu tuottovaatimus ”R” (usein tunnettu diskonttokorkona), joka edustaa ICC arvoa. Näistä 
kolmesta arvosta luodaan synteettinen pääomakustannusindeksi, jossa kullakin ratkaistulla arvolla 
on yhtäläiset painokertoimet. Tämän jälkeen kustannusindeksi muutetaan oman pääoman riski 
preemioksi vähentämällä siitä todellinen markkinakorko. 
Tilastollisten testien perusteella voidaan sanoa, että yrityksen johto seuraa oman yrityksensä 
pääomakustannustasoja ja tekee sen perusteella pääomituspäätöksiä. Tämä ilmiö on kasvanut 
entistä voimakkaammaksi viime vuosien aikana. Näyttää kuitenkin siltä, että yritykset seuraavat 
makrotason pääomakustannusindikaattoreita vieläkin tarkemmin. Muutokset veroasteessa ja 
kasvumahdollisuuksissa vaikuttavat myös johdon päätöksiin ja tukevat täten trade-off – teoriaa. 
Pecking order – teoria näyttäisi menettäneen huomattavasti kykyään selittää yritysten 
pääomarakenteeseen liittyvää päätöksentekoa 1970-luvun jälkeen. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Maybe one of the better known finance and investing related quotes is the not-as-easy-to-follow 
rule that you should buy when the prices are low and sell when they are high. A quote usually 
linked to value investors such like Warren Buffet, sounds simple but requires hard work when 
trying to comply with. This sort of thinking, is not only unique for the capital market investors 
such as traders or regular retail investors, but can be linked to companies as well. As the price of 
external funding, whether it be equity, debt or something in between, changes over time, 
companies may try to take advantage of these movements are finance their operations and 
investment opportunities by issuing capital that is the least expensive for the company. This kind 
of a thinking is commonly referred as the market timing theory, but there are a lot of other theories 
related to the funding behavior of companies that do not see this sort of behavior relevant or even 
possible. 
The most notable theories of capital structure and securities issuance are the static trade-off theory, 
the pecking order theory (Elton, 1999), and the market timing theory (Dong, Loncarski, Horst, & 
Veld, 2012). The initial idea of building a general theoretical framework for companies’ capital 
structuring processes originates from the notion of a trade-off process in which the benefits and 
costs of securities issuances are compared to find out the perceived optimal capital structure for a 
given company. According to the pecking order theory a standard hierarchical order of capital 
sourcing is generally followed when making these decisions. Companies will prefer using the 
cheapest form of capital, the internally generated funds, as the default first choice. If the internal 
funding is inadequate or it is not available at all, companies will favor the less expensive (straight) 
debt capital issues over the more expensive convertible debt. New equity issuance is only 
considered as a final option, as it is considered to be the most expensive external source for capital. 
The market timing theory on the other hand, is based on the idea that the managers of firms are 
able to time the market and issue equity capital when the shares of the respective firm are 
overvalued in the market, and repurchase the shares as they become undervalued. This view 
challenges the standard capital sourcing hierarchy implied by the pecking order theory. 
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In their paper, Huang and Ritter (2009) recorded fluctuations in the time-series patterns of U.S. 
based firms’ financing activities. These fluctuations show that an average firm relied increasingly 
on external capital market financing during the time period from 1963 to 2001. Especially 
interesting is that, it was pointed out that the firms issued an increasing amount of external equity 
securities relative to debt securities. These findings offer insightful evidence against the traditional 
pecking order theory. As a part of this thesis, I have also studied the time-series patterns of U.S. 
based publicly traded companies from 1974 to 2013. These findings support the evidence, recorded 
by Huang and Ritter (2009), which seem to be against the traditional pecking order theory. In my 
study, the relative amount of net equity issuances has been growing during the sample period from 
1974 to 2013. A more exhaustive picture of this development is provided in the latter sections of 
this paper. 
To test these theories and their hypothesized world, a measure reflecting the relative cost of capital 
has to be computed. It has been recognized by the existing finance and accounting literature that 
ex post realized returns offer a noisy proxy for the cost of equity capital (e.g., Froot & Frankel, 
1989; Gebhardt et al., 2001; Hou et al., 2012). Thus, in this paper I apply an alternative, ex ante, 
approach on determining the cost of capital, namely the implied cost of capital (ICC) model. 
Moreover, this ICC measure is used to compute an implied equity risk premium that is used to 
further track the relative cost of capital implied by the capital market. In contrast to the prior 
research on the topic, I will be computing a firm-level estimate for the equity risk premium. An 
ICC model derives the cost of capital as an internal rate of return (IRR) that equates the market 
value of equity and the forecasted future earnings of a given firm. This approach differs from the 
models applied in the prior studies by computing a single, market driven figure that can be used to 
track the historical cost of capital numbers. Furthermore, the computed ICC figures also offer a 
representation of market based valuation, and thus offer a good proxy on determining whether the 
company is historically over- or undervalued. 
 
1.1. Academic and practical motivation 
In this thesis, I study whether the implied firm-level equity risk premium, computed by the chosen 
ICC framework, supports the market timing theory. I will also apply additional statistical methods 
to see whether the two other capital structure theories can explain the way how companies finance 
3 
 
 
their operations. Although, the different capital structure theories are generally relatively well 
documented and researched, there has only been a couple of studies (see. Gebhardt et al., 2001; 
Huang & Ritter, 2009) where the implied cost of capital framework is employed to best of my 
knowledge. As the implied cost of capital framework offers a single simple measure of the 
company’s capital costs, and it is a fairly new concept in the field of finance, the increasing interest 
in the subject has created a need to explore the relation of such measure and underlying financial 
theories, here, more precisely, theories of companies’ capital structure. The implied cost of capital 
framework frees the research of these topics from use of ex post expected returns. I will use a 
modified implied cost of capital calculation methodology, suggested by Hou, van Dijk and Zhang 
(2010), that, in contrast to the study made Huang and Ritter (2009), does not rely on biased analyst 
forecasts but uses the corporate financial data to project future earnings that are used to calculate 
the ICC measure.  In addition, my estimates for the ICC are firm-specific in contrast to the market 
wide measures used by Huang Ritter who compute the ICC figures using only Dow 30 companies 
and apply this ICC figure as an index to all of the sample companies.  
To measure the expected returns, the standard procedure, laid down by the prior research, has been 
heavily reliable on the ex post realized returns as a proxy for the future patterns. This practice has 
been recently challenged by several researchers (Gebhardt et al., 2001; Hou et al., 2012), who have 
pointed out the noisy nature of such data as a proxy for future returns. It has also been shown by 
Elton (1999) that the average realized returns can differ significantly from the computed, expected 
return values over a prolonged period of time. Another way to compute ex post expected returns 
has historically been to use some asset pricing model such as capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
or the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. The problem with these models is that they, 
too, are based on realized returns and fall for the same fallacy. In addition to the aforementioned 
problems with the ex post realized returns, it has been shown by several studies (e.g., Schröder, 
2007) that these models can be extremely imprecise when predicting the future. Due to these faulty 
premises in estimating expected returns, recent finance and accounting studies (see e.g., Claus & 
Thomas, 2001; Gebhardt et al., 2001; Gordon & Gordon, 1997; Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth, 2005) 
have been proposing a new kind of methodology to compute the ex post expected returns, namely 
the implied cost of capital that equates the market value of equity and the forecasted future earnings 
of a given firm producing an internal rate of return like, ex ante measure that solves the equation 
and represents the expected return (or the so-called discount rate applied in valuation models). In 
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other words, the market price is seen as reflecting the actual return expectations for the company 
and by backward engineering the commonly used valuation models, it is possible to solve for the 
discount rate, or the expected return, that is, on average, applied by the market at a specific point 
in time. 
 
1.2. Research problem and purpose 
It has been shown in the prior literature (Fama & French, 2005) that firms issue external equity 
increasingly frequently and that firms can issue external equity even when they have internally 
generated funds at hand or could have issued additional debt. This sort of behavior is essentially 
against the traditional pecking order theory. Fama and French (2005) contribute this behavior on 
such factors as, new external equity financing tools (e.g. stock financed acquisitions and employee 
stock option plans) that are less prone to information asymmetries and therefore lead into 
increasing amount of external equity financing. However, they fail to offer any explanation on 
why the likelihood of funding an acquisition with external equity is time-variant (increase in 
1990s), and why the popularity of such instruments like employee stock options has increased over 
time despite the fact that they have been an integral part of financial markets for long. In addition, 
they fail to provide any explanation on the fact that the financing activities of firms seem to 
significantly deviate from decade to decade. I arrive at the same notion that the relative amount of 
debt and equity security issuances vary across the chosen sample period. In addition, I also find 
that the relative importance of equity financing has in general increased over time. 
To empirically analyze the impact of the time-varying relative cost of equity on capital structure 
decisions made by companies, Huang and Ritter (2009) examined a sample of U.S. based 
companies during a time period from 1963 to 2001, and hypothesize that the capital structure is 
affected mainly by changes in the relative cost of capital. To simplify, firms tend to issue external 
equity (debt) when the relative cost of equity is low (high). In addition, they assume that the static 
trade-off theory as well as the traditional pecking order theory are of second importance when 
explaining firms’ funding decisions. Furthermore, these two theories seem to be unable to explain 
the major time series patterns in capital issuances. The trade-off theory seems to be doing better 
than the traditional pecking order theory, as the tax shield effect captured from the interest 
payments on existing debt plays a key role. 
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In their paper, Huang and Ritter (2009) find that by dropping the underlying assumption about the 
semi-strong form of financial markets efficiency, the market timing theory offers a better 
explanation for the observed patterns of financing decisions than the two other aforementioned 
alternative capital structure theories. For example, they observe that if the implied equity market 
risk premium increases by 1 percentage point, i.e. from three to four percent, this will result in 
approximately three percent more of the financing deficit being funded with net debt (i.e. from 
32% to 35%). This finding is strongly both economically and statistically significant. However, 
the calculation method used by Huang and Ritter (2009) to compute the implied cost of capital is 
somewhat inadequate, as it is not firm-specific but an estimate for the whole market, calculated 
from extremely large Dow 30 companies that represent only a small part of the existing U.S. based 
company population. In addition, the calculation method adopted from Ritter & Warr (2002) is 
outdated and is not supported by the recent models used in the implied cost of capital framework. 
The computed estimates may also experience some modeling bias, as it is derived by using only 
one valuation model, namely a version of the residual income model.  
Thus, in my study I will focus on a similar set of publicly listed U.S. companies and to further 
develop the idea laid down by Huang and Ritter (2009), I will introduce an ICC model that is not 
based on the analyst reports, large Dow 30 companies, nor a single valuation model. The model 
will apply firm-specific self-forecasted earnings estimates that are based on the fundamental 
accounting information available for the publicly traded companies, and the final composite cost 
estimate index will be composed of estimates from three separate ICC models. The applied 
methodology is based on the recent research on ICC and is widely recognized to be more precise 
and less biased than the analyst-based ICC models. 
 
1.3. Contribution to existing research 
My thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature by providing additional empirical evidence 
on how well the three main capital structure theories explain the time-series patterns in the 
financing patterns of the publicly traded U.S. companies when studied by using the most latest 
cost of capital measuring techniques. In addition, this thesis is the first paper to use the model-
based firm-level ICC models to test the aforementioned behavior. The prior research has been 
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mainly based on analyst data, ex post return data or market-level data. In more detail, this thesis 
contributes to the existing literature mainly in three ways: 
1. By testing which of the aforementioned capital structure theories seems to explain the time-
varying funding behavior of the publicly traded U.S. companies the best. This examination 
should provide a well-structured robustness check for the prior analyzes conducted by 
Huang and Ritter (2009) in their work. 
2. By using firm-level implied equity risk premium estimates to see whether companies 
follow the market wide equity risk premium levels more closely than the firm-level ones. 
As Huang and Ritter (2009) apply a market wide implied equity risk premium computed 
by using only the Dow 30 companies, I am able to compare my firm-specific results to 
theirs on a general level. 
3. By using the model-based ICC approach, suggested by the recent research, to test the 
importance of implied equity market risk premium on capital structure decisions. By 
applying the model-based ICC measures, the methodology uses the most recent approach 
suggested by the research and thus gives further validity for the conducted tests. 
 
1.4. Limitations of the study 
This study focuses on listed companies in the U.S. and thus does not include observations from 
other markets, such as Europe, China, or the emerging markets. It is proposed in the paper by 
Huang and Ritter (2009) that the importance of the implied equity risk premium for corporate 
financing decisions should be further studied in other locations than the U.S. as their paper is 
focused on such publicly traded companies. They make this proposition based on the fact that their 
findings heavily suggest that the time-varying implied equity risk premium explains most of the 
observed external financing decisions made by the sample firms. As their sample of U.S. based 
companies does not offer any insight on the relevance of implied equity risk premium in other 
markets, this limitation in sampling is justified. 
There are several different models on which the implied cost of capital measure can be calculated 
with. These models assume different approaches on calculating for instance the future earnings 
growth rate patterns and terminal values. This has led to an empirical discussion on whether some 
of the models perform better in generating expectations of future cash flows. Prior research has 
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been conducted to press this issue and several studies have shown that there is a considerable 
correlations between the derived implied cost of equity measures. However, the prior literature 
(e.g., Botosan & Plumlee, 2005; Easton & Monahan, 2005) finds no consensus as to which is the 
best representation. Thus, to overcome this problem of subjectively choosing the best alternative 
calculation method, I use a composite ICC estimate that comprises of three individual ICC 
estimates that are based on three different valuation models commonly used in deriving these 
estimates. Therefore, the estimates used in my study should not experience any major bias based 
on the applied valuation method. 
There are also additional restrictions concerning the sampling as certain variables are needed in 
order to compute the required estimates. For instance, when computing the earnings estimates by 
using the acquired regression coefficients, certain variables are needed to exist to come up with 
forecasted figures. Also, there needs to be certain number of firm years available in the data set 
for the company to be included, as for instance the earnings estimate regression requires at least 6 
years of data points in order to be applied. Thus, the dataset is somewhat reduced from the initial 
dataset that can be imported from Compustat, but this should not create any distortions in the 
remaining data as the deletion of data points is fairly well distributed along the whole dataset. Also 
each time bucket used seems to have relatively good number of observations so that none single 
year is suffering from an extremely low number of observations. 
 
1.5. Main findings 
Based on my statistical tests using the firm-level model-based implied cost of capital estimates, 
further leading into computing the firm-level implied equity risk premium, companies seem to 
time the market as the time-variant cost of equity clearly affects companies’ financing decisions. 
In other words, companies seems to issue more equity when it is relatively cheap and issue less 
when it is relatively more expensive. This behavior grants power to the market timing theory that 
in contrast to the other traditional capital structure theories allows for such market inefficiencies 
to exist. 
Furthermore, when comparing my results with the earlier results by Huang and Ritter (2009), I 
find that their implied market equity premium (calculated only for the Dow Jones 30 constituents) 
seems to drive this behavior more strongly than the firm-level estimates computed by using the 
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model described in my paper. This could be because of the fact that company management does 
not have good enough visibility on their firm-level cost of equity, or the data or tools to asses this 
indicator, and thus they settle to only follow the market based fluctuations in the costs that is easier 
to follow and asses. 
I also find that the so-called pecking order slope coefficient has decreased notably over the whole 
time period from the beginning of the latter half of the 1970s to 2014. The slope coefficient is 
initially based on the work by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) who introduced an empirical test 
for the pecking order theory. The pecking order slope coefficient provides information on what 
proportion of a one unit increase in the financing deficit is financed by debt. Based on pecking 
order theory, companies prefer debt as a mean of external financing and thus the slope coefficient 
should be close to unity. My findings are in line with the prior studies where a similar pattern has 
been spotted (e.g., Huang and Ritter, 2009; Frank and Goyal, 2003). The slope coefficient was 
around 0.9 for the second half of the 1970s and has decreased to around 0.25 in 2013. 
 
1.6. Structure of the thesis 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical background and 
the previous empirical findings explaining the different capital structure theories in more detail 
and the implied cost of capital framework. I discuss my main hypotheses in Section 3. Section 4 
describes the sampling methods, the data characteristics and the methodology used in the study. In 
Section 5, I show and analyze the empirical results relating to the links between the capital 
structure theories and implied cost of capital. I further show which theories are relevant and which 
are not when analyzing the time-series patterns of capital issuances and cost of equity. I will also 
show how the explanatory power of these theories has evolved over time. Finally, Section 6 
concludes the paper and gives suggestion for further research. 
 
1.7. Terminology definitions 
Table 1 below explains the key terms used in this paper in order to ensure that the reader is aware 
of exact meanings and definitions of these frequently used terms and also to make the reading of 
this paper easier. I have only chosen the most relevant terms that are used throughout the whole 
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paper. Further explanation on these terms and other relevant ones is provided in different parts of 
this paper. In addition, I have provided self-explanatory tables and figures that contain also some 
less detailed explanations on the terms relevant to the object in question. The presented terms in 
Table 1 are the basic concepts underlying some more sophisticated terms, i.e. firm-level implied 
equity risk premium is a more refined and specified equity risk premium measure that is derived 
by using firm-level information in order to solve for the implied cost of capital that is used to 
compute the final estimate for equity risk premium. 
 
Table 1: Definitions of key terminology 
In Table 1 the glossary of the key terms used in this paper are presented. In addition an abbreviation is 
offered, if there exists one, also a brief description of the used term is provided. 
Term Abbreviation Description 
Implied cost of capital ICC 
ICC is the firm’s internal rate of return that 
equates the firm’s share price to the present 
value of expected future cash flows. 
Equity risk premium ERP 
Additional return required over the risk-
free rate for the additional risk associated 
with equity financing. 
Internal rate of return IRR 
Discount rate that makes the net present 
value of cash flow equal to zero. 
Discount rate R 
Interest rate used in valuation models to 
account for time value of money and the 
riskiness of the investment. 
Ex-Ante - Forecasted estimates prior the event 
10 
 
 
Ex Post - Using past data to estimate future. 
Firm-level estimate - 
An estimate calculated for one specific 
company using the financial data of the 
same company. 
Market wide estimate - 
In contrast to the firm-level estimate, this 
estimate is more or less common for the 
whole market in question. 
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2. Literature review 
This section provides an overview on the prior, existing literature on the relevant topics for my 
paper. First, I discuss the capital structure theories in general and how these theories explain capital 
issuances decisions. Next, I discuss how these theories are tested in the existing research. Then I 
introduce the concepts of implied cost of capital and implied market risk premium. Finally, I bring 
up some problems with the current research methods and link new developments in the research 
of implied cost of capital framework to the existing models. 
 
2.1. Selected capital structure theories 
Value of a firm is derived from its ability to generate cash flows from its existing assets. These 
assets are financed by issuing debt or equity capital, or a mix of these two. This mix of capital 
sources, accompanied by the firm’s retained earnings, is often referred as the capital structure of a 
company. The foundations for the modern capital structure theory were created by Modigliani and 
Miller (1985) who argued that in a perfect world, with no friction such as transaction costs and 
taxes, the capital structure of a company is irrelevant. The so-called “proposition 1” states that it 
is not possible to adjust the total value of firm’s securities by dividing its cash flows into separate 
streams. This implies that the actual value of the company is determined only by the real assets 
owned by the company and not by its securities issued. Thus, in the Modigliani and Miller (MM) 
world, it is possible to completely separate investment and financing decisions as the company is 
indifferent with the source of capital it issues. Furthermore, the “proposition 1” suggests that the 
firm-level cost of capital does not depend on the issued securities, i.e. the cost of capital is the 
same for an all-equity financed firm and for a firm that uses a mixture of debt and equity. 
The requirements of the MM world are however extremely strict and do not correspond to the real 
life challenges and opportunities that are created by interruptions in the perfect market model, e.g. 
tax levy on corporate earnings and the potential bankruptcy costs arising from the possibility of 
corporate insolvency. The theorem has been later revised by Modigliani and Miller (1963) as they 
find that due to the tax deductibility of debt, or the so-called tax shield effect, firms will prefer 
debt over equity to reach the capital structure that is perceived as optimal. Now it is rather widely 
recognized that the so-called optimal capital structure is indeed less than 100% of pure debt 
financing. The prior studies have had emphasis on such factors that are assumed to reflect the 
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possible benefits and costs related to certain capital structure situations. Among others, maybe the 
most relevant papers have found such factors as firm size, profitability, growth rate, firm risk and 
industry characteristics to be the most influential factors when talking about the determination of 
an optimal capital structure (see. Michaelas, Chittenden, & Poutziouris, 1999; Titman & Wessels, 
1988 etc.) 
Following the set up proposed by Modigliani and Miller, several other theories have been 
developed to add frictions to the initial model trying to explain how the capital structure is 
constructed in a more realistic world. The three capital structure theories presented next explain 
why the actual capital structures observed in the market deviate from the proposed MM set up. 
 
2.1.1. Static trade-off theory 
The static Trade-off Theory is based on the idea proposed by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) that 
the existing capital structure is a product of comparing the cost of debt and the benefits of debt. 
They state that if the interest paid on debt shields the profits from taxation, i.e. the paid interest is 
tax deductible, profitable companies with low levels debt financing should issue more debt to 
benefit from the increased tax deductions. Furthermore, the theory suggests that the debt financing 
could be increased to the level where the risk of bankruptcy and the related costs become relevant. 
The static trade-off theory is also incorporated with the idea of a firm-specific optimal capital 
structure that is known and pursued by the management. Visualization of this idea is presented in 
Figure 1. In Figure 1, first the gains from the tax shield increase the company’s market value, but 
as the relative amount of debt increases, the financial distress costs start to affect the company’s 
value. Thus, in order to maximize the company’s value, an optimal point has to be reached by 
balancing these benefits and costs. 
However, the evidence supporting the static trade-off theory is somewhat mixed. Many of the 
studies find that lower leverage is associated with higher profitability and thus is inconsistent with 
the view that more profitable companies should borrow more to increase the benefits gained from 
the tax shield (e.g., Fama & French, 2002; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Titman & Wessels, 1988). 
Based on a survey conducted on corporate executives by Graham and Harvey (2001), the firm-
specific leverage targets are more or less soft. 
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Alternatively, several studies (e.g., Hovakimian, Hovakimian, & Tehranian, 2004; Korajczyk & 
Levy, 2003; Marsh, 1982) find that there exists a firm-specific target level for leverage that is used 
as part of the capital issuance and repurchase decision making processes. Leary and Roberts (2005) 
confirm that although most of the time firms appear to be inactive towards their financial policies, 
their securities issuances and buy backs appear to happen in clusters to adjust the capital structure 
toward the set target leverage level. Myers (1984) shows that the costs of adjusting the corporate 
capital structure are the main reason for non-optimal capital structures observed in the market. The 
absence of these costs would result in most of the companies converging the optimal capital 
structure implied by the trade-off theory. 
 
Figure 1: Static trade-off theory 
Figure 1 depicts the optimal capital structure target hypothesized by the traditional static trade-off theory. 
The optimal capital structure assumption is built around the idea the a firm balances its marginal values of 
interest tax shields against the costs of financial distress from the increased debt levels on the firm’s balance 
sheet. 
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2.1.2. Pecking order theory 
The pecking order theory is based originally on the papers by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf 
(1984). According to Myers and Majluf, the pecking order of capital sources is based on 
informational asymmetries between the external investors and creditor, and the firm’s 
management. Thus, the outside investors are willing to buy the issued securities only if they are 
sold at a discount. Furthermore, as the managers are aware of such behavior the firm tends to 
follows a certain hierarchy of capital sources as it needs to finance its operations and investments.  
Firms prefer the internally generated funds, also known as the retained earnings, and adjust their 
dividend payout policies so that there is no need for more expensive external funding. If the 
internal funds are inadequate to cover firm’s capital requirements, additional external funding has 
to be raised. In this situation, the firm will favor the less expensive straight debt financing, followed 
by the more expensive convertible debt. As debt financing is more secured from the stand point of 
the investor, they will require lower discount. Additional equity is issued only as the final source 
of capital as it is associated with the highest costs for the company.  
However, information asymmetries are just one possible explanation for this hierarchy of capital 
sources, the existing literature has found several other reasons for this phenomenon, such as 
transactions costs (Donaldson, 1961), managerial optimism (e.g., Heaton, 2002; Lee, 1997) and 
hidden information costs (MacKie-Mason, 1990). 
Like the static trade-off theory, pecking order theory has received mixed support from several prior 
studies. In a study conducted on recent IPO companies Helwege and Liang (1996) find that the 
probability of raising external capital is unrelated to the shortage of internal funds, although 
companies with excess cash reserves are inclined to not issue additional external capital. Fama and 
French (2005) show that, in contrast to pecking order theory, firms issue, repurchase equity or do 
both regularly and it does not seem act as a last resort for financing the investments and operations 
of a company.  It is also suggested by Fama and French that modern financing tools can be used 
to raise external capital as there are securities which involve less informational asymmetry. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) tested the pecking order theory against the preceding capital 
structure theory, the static trade-off theory. In their study they find that the pecking order model, 
predicting external debt financing to be driven by financial deficit, has greater explanatory power 
than the model suggested by the static trade-off theory. 
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2.1.3. Market timing theory 
In addition to these two more traditional capital structure theories, a more behavioral based model 
of market timing has been developed to capture the time varying nature of corporate debt ratios. 
The market timing theory suggests that in contrast to the semi-strong market efficiency assumption 
incorporated in both the static trade-off theory and pecking order theory, the market can be 
somewhat inefficient. Thus, observable ‘windows of opportunities’ emerge in the capital markets. 
Furthermore, to minimize the cost of capital, Stein (1996) suggests that firms need to take 
advantage of these time varying market inefficiencies. 
The inefficiencies in the market creates fluctuations in equity and debt security prices. Due to these 
fluctuations, the market timing theory suggests that the corporate management may perceive the 
market to misvalue its securities. If the relative market price of issuing equity is low (high), the 
company issues equity (debt) conditional to its existing and prevailing financing requirements (see 
Table 1. as reference). It has been debated in the prior literature how the management judges the 
relative price of such funding. It has been proposed, on the other hand, that the company 
management has superior insight on the prevailing cost of the company itself and better 
understanding of the whole industry’s costs. On the other hand, prospect theory suggests that 
certain reference points, such as the historical 52-week highs or lows1, are followed by the 
corporate management and these, psychological patterns, may act as underlying triggers for such 
behavior.  
In contrast to the other two theories, market timing theory does not assume the semi-strong form 
of market efficiency. Due to this fact, it is possible to assume that the external equity can be cheaper 
to issue than the external debt. Thus, the firm can take advantage of such misvaluation and raise 
capital according to the prevailing market conditions before this inefficiency in the market 
disappear. Furthermore, this implies that in contrast to the traditional pecking order theory, equity 
issuances are not that rare. Huang and Ritter (2009) show that the original pecking order theory is 
actually a special case within the market timing framework. The different financing hierarchies 
                                                 
1 The special role of the 52-week highs and lows is well research topic in the field on finance and economics. Benartzi 
and Thaler (1995) and Heath et al. (1999) shows that investors on average seem to evaluate their investments against 
a historical moving period of approximately one year. In addition, interviews with financial experts show that the 52-
week backward evaluation period is also well established among the bankers working with mergers and acquisitions. 
This sort of behavior leads into evaluating the relative cost of equity against the historical movements in the cost 
within the preceding 52-week period.  
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based on different market scenarios are summarized in Table 1. When it is cheaper for the firm to 
issue external equity than it is to issue debt securities, firms prefer external equity if they seek 
external financing. When external equity becomes really cheap, issuing equity is perceived even 
as the first choice when it comes to funding the company. Likewise, when issuing debt securities 
becomes really cheap, issuing debt securities is seen as first choice. Companies may issue equity 
or debt even if they do not have any direct financing requirements or do not need to regulate their 
company capital structure. This is due to the fact that issuing securities that are overvalued in the 
market are is themselves positive NPV yielding projects. 
 
Table 2: Financing hierarchies 
Illustration of different financing hierarchies as the relative cost of capital changes and issuing certain securities 
becomes more favorable. 
Normal market conditions 
When external equity is less 
expensive than debt 
When external equity is really 
cheap, and debt is expensive 
1) Internal equity 1) Internal equity 1) External equity 
2) Debt 2) External equity 2) Internal equity 
3) External equity 3) Debt 3) Debt 
   
When external equity is really 
cheap, and debt is cheap 
When debt is really cheap, and 
external equity is expensive 
When debt is really cheap, and 
external equity is cheap 
1) External equity 1) Debt 1) Debt 
2) Debt 2) Internal equity 2) External equity 
3) Internal equity 3) External equity 3) Internal equity 
 
Only recently researchers have been starting to link the cost of equity to the development of capital 
structure. It was found in a paper by Baker and Wurgler (2002) that the external finance-weighted 
average of historical market-to-book ratios correlates negatively to existing market leverage, 
which can be interpret as evidence for market timing. Moreover, Aydogan (2004) and Kayhan and 
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Titman (2004) study market timing further and find evidence supporting the timing assumption of 
security issuance. 
 
The prior literature has been focused on testing these theories by using historical realized returns 
as a proxy for cost of equity. However, it has been concluded by Fama and French (1997) that the 
procedure to compute the cost of equity measures using realized returns is imprecise as it is 
difficult to identify the appropriate asset-pricing model and the process used to estimate the factor 
loadings, as well as the factor risk premium, are somewhat imprecise. In addition, it can be easily 
argued that the past does not necessarily offer a good enough proxy for the future. Thus, another, 
alternative way, to compute the implied equity risk premium has been developed. The time-
variations and the general decline during the last few decades in the historical implied equity risk 
premium can be argued to have been caused by several irrational and rational factors. Regardless 
of the rationality or irrationality, the market timing theory simply implies that the changes in the 
relative cost of equity have central importance when analyzing the capital structure of companies. 
 
2.2. Implied cost of capital framework 
To compute cost of equity measures for companies, the prior research has been heavily reliant on 
historical realized returns. As earlier discussed in this paper, the realized returns are somewhat 
inconsistent at best for forecasting the future expected returns (see e.g., Elton, 1999; Gebhardt et 
al., 2001; Hou et al., 2012). To overcome deficiencies related to realize returns based measures, 
the existing literature has proposed an alternative method to compute these figures, namely implied 
cost of capital. ICC is the firm’s internal rate of return that equates the firm’s share price to the 
present value of expected future cash flows. Simply put, it is the discount rate that the market uses 
to discount the projected cash flows from the firm to value the company’s stock.  This process 
overcomes the problem of using a specific asset pricing model and the noisy nature of realized 
returns as the expected returns are derived from the share price and cash flow forecasts. 
In the prior ICC literature, the future cash flow expectations are estimated using the analysts’ 
earnings forecasts (Huang & Ritter, 2009). One of the reasons, alas, why this method has been so 
widely accepted is its simplicity as the cash flow expectations can be taken as given in the analyst 
reports. However, several recent studies (e.g., Easton & Monahan, 2005; Gebhardt et al., 2001) 
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have found that the analyst-based ICC figures do not perform well when taking a deeper look how 
they are able to predict the future realized returns. Easton and Monahan (2005) show more 
specifically that after controlling for cash flow and discount rate related news, the analyst-based 
ICC measure has only little predictive power for the future realized returns. They also state that 
due to the heavy reliance on the analysts’ earnings forecast quality, the analyst-based ICC model 
significantly lacks reliability. 
There are also other concerns with the analyst-based ICC model. One reason why the analyst-
based ICC model lacks reliability, is the fact that the earnings forecasts produced by analysts suffer 
from considerable biases. Several studies (e.g., Easton & Sommers, 2007; Francis & Philbrick, 
1993; Lin & McNichols, 1998) show that the when making earnings forecasts, analyst tend to be 
overly optimistic about the future developments. Thus, the analyst forecasts are not objective 
enough to reveal the real expected future earnings. Furthermore, Easton and Sommers (2007) 
record the average upward bias in these reports to be 2.84%, which is a considerable deviation 
when compared to the recorded average equity premium in the vicinity of %, which could be 
eliminated by purely removing the average bias. In addition, the lack of coverage concerning the 
small and financially distressed firms in the analyst databases may govern the data. 
To address this problem related to the analyst-based ICC model, Hou, van Dijk and Zhang (2012) 
have produced a new way to compute the necessary ICC figures by using earnings forecasts 
generated by a cross-sectional model to proxy firms’ cash flow expectations. This new approach 
estimates model-based  earnings  forecasts  for  up  to  five  years  into  the  future  and  then  use  
those earnings  forecasts  to  compute the  ICC figure  for  the selected group of firms. This method 
is backed up by prior literature (e.g., Fama & French, 2000; Hou & Robinson, 2006) that show 
cross-sectional models to be able to explain a large fraction of the variation in expected 
profitability across firms. 
The above described “model-based” method owns much of its advantages to the fact that it is able 
to use even the largest cross-sectional data of individual firms to produce the required earnings 
forecast numbers. Moreover, this procedure offers additional statistical power for the model while 
imposing it only to minimal survivorship requirements. As the model-based ICC requires only a 
limited amount of accounting data and price of the publicly traded stock, the coverage offered by 
this model is substantially more comprehensive than the coverage offered by the analyst-based 
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model. In addition, the model-based approach opens a possibility to cover firm records that go 
further back in time than any database recording the analyst earnings forecasts. 
Hou, van Dijk and Zhang (2012) also show that although their model generates earnings forecasts 
that are on average less accurate than analysts’ forecasts in terms of R2, they exhibit substantially 
lower forecast bias levels and, most importantly, much higher earnings response coefficient (ERC) 
levels than the forecasts made by analysts. The fact that the ERC levels are much higher than those 
related to the analyst forecasts, suggests the cross-sectional model-based earnings forecasts work 
on average as a better proxy for market expectations of the firms’ future profitability. 
 
2.3. Implied cost of capital models 
To compute the final ICC measure, a model, from which the internal rate of return (or the applied 
discount rate R) representing the implied cost of capital is solved by using the computed firm-level 
earnings forecast, has to be chosen. There are several different sort of models presented in the prior 
literature on implied cost of capital that are originally based on different valuation tools. The most 
relevant models are the CT (see e.g., Claus & Thomas, 2001), Modified price-earnings growth, 
also known as MPEG (Easton, 2004), G, Gordon (Gordon & Gordon, 1997) and OJ (Ohlson & 
Juettner-Nauroth, 2005). Although all of these models aim for the end result of a company 
valuation output, they are notably different in terms of applied time periods and input data for 
example. These five models can be broadly divided into three groups based on the initial valuation 
method that they originate from. The broad division is visible from Table 3 that divides the models 
under residual income valuation method, abnormal earnings growth-based valuation method and 
Gordon growth model valuation method. There exists additional models to do these calculations, 
but the ones chosen here are widely used in the prior literature and research on their validity and 
other features has been already been conducted. 
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Table 3: ICC model classification 
Illustration of the different ICC models divided under the traditional valuation model that is used to derive 
the internal rate of return representing the implied cost of capital. 
Residual income valuation 
Abnormal  earnings  growth-
based valuation 
Gordon growth model valuation 
Claus & Thomas (CT) Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (OJ) Gordon 
Gebhardt, Lee & Swaminathan 
(GLS) 
Modified price-earnings growth 
(MPEG) 
 
 
Residual income valuation (RIV) based methods calculate the current stock price by using two 
main components: 1) the present value of expected dividends per share over a short or medium-
term time horizon, and 2) a discounted terminal value, which represents the present value of the 
expected share price at the end of the chosen time period, assuming that dividends then grow at a 
constant rate in perpetuity. The CT model uses this framework with forecasting time horizon set 
to four years and the terminal growth rate set to the same level as the prevailing expected inflation 
rate. The other model based on RIV is GLS, which has two main differences when compared to 
the CT model described earlier. In contrast to the CT model, GLS uses a longer forecast time 
horizon of twelve years after which the residual income becomes perpetuity. In addition, after three 
years, the expected return on equity (ROE) is set to mean-revert to the historical industry media 
value by the eleventh year. The advantage of this method is that only few years of forecasted 
earnings figures are required as the forecasts lose their predictive power when going further in to 
the future. 
Abnormal earnings growth-based valuation models on the other hand assume that the change in 
abnormal earnings grows from year to year at a constant rate into perpetuity. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that the forecasted change in growth is constant. To compute the OJ model-based cost of 
equity, the relation between the stock price, next year’s earnings per share (EPS) estimate and the 
next year’s expected dividends per share has to be solved. The MPEG model is a special case of 
the OJ model where the growth rate in the change of dividends is set to zero so that the dividends 
grow at the same growth rate into perpetuity. 
The Gordon growth valuation model is the simplest of the models. The model is based on a special 
case of the traditional Gordon growth model where a constant earnings growth rate is assumed to 
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continue into perpetuity. The problem with this method is the fact that the long-term constant 
growth rates are hard to define or soundly reason. In addition, the growth rate cannot be larger than 
the long-term expected GDP growth rate as this would result in earnings, at some point in future, 
larger than the whole economy.  
In order to compute the implied equity market risk premium from the output of chosen ICC models, 
I need to subtract the prevailing risk-free rate from the calculated internal rate of return. In this 
paper I use the annualized nominal rate of return on one month U.S. treasury bills (T-bills) as the 
risk-free rate to denote the default-free (U.S. government) bond rate. These numbers are published 
by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.  
  
22 
 
 
3. Hypotheses 
 
In this study I test whether the traditional capital structure theories play a role in the financing 
decisions made by U.S. listed companies. In more detail, I will be focusing on the implied cost of 
capital framework, or more specifically the implied equity risk premium, and its time-variant 
nature. The time-variant nature of this variable might be explaining the equity issuance patterns 
that are observed. Unlike the previous studies that have been trying to explain these theories, my 
study focuses on the ex-ante returns that do not experience the same problems as ex-post realized 
return-based proxies. Also my proxy for the implied equity risk premium is not a market wide 
variable, but a firm-level estimate that has been calculated for each of the firms in the sample. This 
section outlines the main hypotheses that are tested to answer my research questions provided 
earlier in this paper. I also provide a brief theoretical background to back up these hypotheses. The 
results are presented in the empirical section of this paper, namely chapter 5. 
The main goal of this paper is to study the time series patterns of external financing in the U.S. 
market. It has been shown in a prior study conducted on the U.S. publicly traded firms by Huang 
and Ritter (2009) that the time-variations in the relative cost of equity (market wide estimate), 
described by market timing theory, explain the year-to-year variations in the use of debt and 
external equity financing better than the pecking order or the trade-off theory. In this paper, I 
instead apply a firm-level estimate for the relative cost of capital but do not anticipate this to offer 
results of entirely different nature. Thus, I state my first hypothesis as follows: 
 
H1: Market timing theory explains better the observed time-series patterns of external financing 
decisions than the two alternative theories of capital structure. 
 
Neither the static trade-off theory nor pecking order theory provide a sufficient answer to why 
variations in the time-series patterns of firms’ capital structures are observed. Huang and Ritter 
(2009) show that firms adjust extremely slowly towards their target leverage ratios, which is 
inconsistent with the static trade-off theory. They also show that the assumption of the semi-strong 
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form of market efficiency does not hold as such and thus variations in the relative cost of equity 
lead into adjustment of firms’ capital structure. This observation undermines the explanatory 
power of the pecking order theory that assumes the semi-strong form of market efficiency. 
Regardless of these prior results, I assume the trade-off theory to be able to better explained the 
observed results due to the importance of the tax shield. Thus, my second hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H2: Due to the tax shield effect arising from the interest payments on debt, the trade-off theory 
explains the financing decisions made by companies better than the pecking order theory. 
 
The elimination of the semi-strong market efficiency assumption leads into the market timing 
theory that is based on the idea that when the relative cost of equity is high (low), companies issue 
less (more) external equity in relation to other financing means. Following the results from the 
previous studies, the implied cost of equity should play a key role when the companies are making 
their capital structure decisions. Following the paper by Huang and Ritter (2009), I will use the 
implied equity risk premium as the proxy for relative cost of equity. In contrast to Huang and 
Ritter, I will not be using a market wide estimate for the equity risk premium as it does not reflect 
the firm-level characteristics. Instead of using applying the implied market equity risk premium, 
calculated only from the Dow Jones 30 companies, I will be applying a firm-level estimate of 
equity risk premium that should account for the company specific characteristics in more detail. 
Therefore, my second hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H3: The implied firm-level equity risk premium is off high importance when companies make 
decision on adjusting their capital structure. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned hypotheses, the availability of a prior study using the market-
level implied equity risk premium allows me to compare the effect of a firm-level cost estimate 
and the effect of a market-wide cost estimate on companies’ funding behavior. Based on the study 
by Graham and Harvey (2001), I expect the management to be more sensitive to changes in the 
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firm-level cost of capital. Graham and Harvey find in their qualitative study that firm-level 
indicators of capital costs are of the highest priority, although the based mainly on ex-post realized 
returns employed by such models as CAPM and arithmetic average historical returns.  As the firm-
level equity risk premium might be more challenging to observe than the existing macro level 
equity risk premiums, companies might react weaker to changes in the firm-level levels. 
Regardless, I set my fourth and final hypothesis according to the prior research as follows: 
 
H4: Changes in the firm-level implied equity risk premium affect companies’ funding behavior 
stronger than changes in the market-level implied equity risk premium. 
 
To test the above stated hypotheses, I use data from firms’ financial reports and stock market price 
data for selected U.S. based listed companies. The data is used to create firm-level earnings 
estimates that are further applied to solve for the implied cost of capital. The implied cost of capital 
data is used in the statistical tests alongside with additional macroeconomic data. The data, 
calculation methods and statistical test methodology is further described in the coming sections of 
this paper. 
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4. Data and methodology 
 
This section starts with the presentation of the sample selection process and descriptive statistics, 
and then continues to illustrate the methodology used to test the aforementioned hypotheses. 
 
4.1. Data 
4.1.1. Sample selection 
In this study I use annual pricing information of the publicly traded companies listed in the U.S. 
markets. The final sample for companies assigned an implied cost of capital estimate consists of 
firms from 1974 to 2013. In order to acquire estimates for firm-years from 1973 to 2013, an initial 
sampling is required to include firm-years starting from year 1968 as the minimum years required 
to compute the earnings estimate is six years. From the sample population I will exclude companies 
characterized as utilities or financial firms as they were regulated heavily during most the sample 
period and their observed capital structures do not reflect the real capital structure decisions. In 
addition, I compute the ICC estimates by using fundamental data available for these companies on 
the Compustat database. The variables based on the firm-level fundamental data are winsorized 
annually at the 1st and the 99th percentile to account for extreme values that can otherwise distort 
the result and therefore cause misleading results. 
 
4.1.2. Sample characteristics 
I have described the final data in Table 4 by year as the yearly fluctuations of financing decisions 
are of interest in my paper. I have defined the debt and equity issuance in a similar manner that 
has been used by the prior literature (see. Fama & French, 2002; Huang & Ritter, 2009). Thus, net 
debt is defined as the change in book debt and net equity is defined as the change in book equity 
minus change in retained earnings. Here, book debt is total liabilities plus preferred stock, minus 
preferred taxes and convertible debt, and book equity is total assets minus book debt. In Table 4, 
the percent of issuers is defined as those firms that within a single year are net securities issuers. 
A net securities issuer is defined a firms that within a given year has a debt or an equity increase 
larger than 5%. 
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Table 4: Percentage of Firms in Different Financing Groups across Time 
An individual firms is defined to issue debt if ∆D scaled with the beginning of the year total assets is at 
least 5%, where ∆D is change in debt and preferred stock from year t-1 to t. Firm is issuing equity if ΔE 
scaled by beginning of year assets is at least 5%, where ΔE is the change in equity and convertible debt 
minus change in retained earnings. The percentages of debt and equity issuers do not necessarily add up to 
100 because firms can issue both debt and equity or neither debt nor equity. 
Year Number of firms Debt issues (%) Equity issues (%) 
1974 143 62.2 % 56.6 % 
1975 237 42.2 % 27.4 % 
1976 271 38.7 % 12.5 % 
1977 349 45.6 % 13.5 % 
1978 807 45.1 % 20.8 % 
1979 888 50.8 % 11.6 % 
1980 1 075 40.3 % 15.9 % 
1981 1 114 39.2 % 16.2 % 
1982 1 187 27.0 % 11.3 % 
1983 1 211 33.6 % 22.2 % 
1984 1 222 38.0 % 13.5 % 
1985 1 334 40.3 % 22.1 % 
1986 1 272 34.5 % 16.3 % 
1987 1 206 38.6 % 14.8 % 
1988 1 156 36.4 % 11.2 % 
1989 1 127 34.9 % 12.2 % 
1990 1 175 33.9 % 11.5 % 
1991 1 236 25.0 % 12.9 % 
1992 1 268 30.9 % 14.7 % 
1993 1 333 34.7 % 23.2 % 
1994 1 321 36.8 % 15.1 % 
1995 1 420 35.8 % 18.9 % 
1996 1 438 34.5 % 21.8 % 
1997 1 400 38.2 % 19.7 % 
1998 1 413 42.7 % 19.9 % 
1999 1 424 40.9 % 20.1 % 
2000 1 408 38.0 % 21.3 % 
2001 1 408 24.8 % 21.2 % 
2002 1 426 28.8 % 21.2 % 
2003 1 472 30.8 % 24.4 % 
2004 1 531 34.9 % 28.3 % 
2005 1 631 34.3 % 27.0 % 
2006 1 656 38.8 % 28.2 % 
2007 1 712 39.5 % 27.3 % 
2008 1 831 34.0 % 22.7 % 
2009 1 860 21.8 % 22.5 % 
2010 1 862 33.6 % 23.6 % 
2011 1 921 36.0 % 23.1 % 
2012 1 976 34.1 % 22.7 % 
2013 1 656 30.0 % 23.3 % 
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From Table 4 it is visible that the amount of net securities issuers is generally higher than the 
number of firms that are not net securities issuers. For instance the amount of net debt issuers never 
falls under 20% of the total firms within a given year and also net equity issuers represent every 
year at least 11% of the total sample. Even at this point, it is observable from Table 4 that net 
equity issues are relatively common. This observation is against the traditional pecking order 
theory that predicts these issues to be relatively rare and to be used by companies as a last resort 
due to their high costs. I contract to the pecking order theory’s predictions, the minimum 
proportion of net equity issuers is more than 11%, peaking at 28.3% in 2004, and staying above 
20% from 2000 onwards. This general finding of ever increasing amount of equity issuers has been 
also documented by Fama and French (2011) in their study. Their time period ends in 2009 but 
based on my observations, the same trend has prevailed and the issuing of equity securities has 
remained strong. 
The total number of firm-year observations through the whole period from 1974 to 2013 is 51 377. 
This number is notably lower than the number of firm-year observations in paper by Huang and 
Ritter (2009). The main reason why this difference in firm-year observations exist, is the fact they 
use the implied equity risk premium derived only from the Dow 30 companies and apply this same 
market wide estimate for each of the firms in the sample. Due to this computational method, the 
availability of firm-level information to calculate these estimates does not restrict the sample size. 
The computational method applied in my paper is also more complicated in the way that I use the 
future earnings forecasts. As I do not apply the analyst reports and corresponding earnings 
forecasts, I need additional data to be used in the regression model described later in this paper in 
order to make my own earnings forecasts. Due to all these additional steps required in my firm-
level model, my sample size is set to be smaller than the one used by Huang and Ritter. Regardless 
of this, my sample is still quite extensive and for each of the years there is at least 140 observations 
including companies with different industry specifications, different sizes, earnings models, 
capital expenditure requirements and geographical reach. Thus, I conclude that the data set is 
extensive enough to draw the results explained in the latter parts of this paper. 
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Table 5: General data characteristics 
In table below the yearly means for general firm-level characteristics are presented for each year. Income 
is the firm’s income before extraordinary items that presents the real income generation of a single 
company. Total assets are presented to illustrate the general size of chosen companies. Both of the variables 
are winsorized in 1st and 99th percentile. 
Year Number of firms Income (before extraordinary items) Total Assets 
1974 143 109.1 1 638.3 
1975 237 87.2 1 487.7 
1976 271 97.8 1 587.4 
1977 349 85.8 1 440.0 
1978 807 51.6 858.8 
1979 888 59.3 901.6 
1980 1 075 54.0 866.9 
1981 1 114 56.2 963.2 
1982 1 187 40.7 917.1 
1983 1 211 44.0 952.7 
1984 1 222 49.6 1 002.5 
1985 1 334 54.6 1 378.7 
1986 1 272 53.8 1 468.1 
1987 1 206 73.2 1 603.9 
1988 1 156 86.3 1 714.1 
1989 1 127 87.7 1 741.6 
1990 1 175 80.6 1 837.7 
1991 1 236 61.3 1 792.8 
1992 1 268 68.1 1 800.8 
1993 1 333 67.5 1 830.3 
1994 1 321 86.5 1 907.2 
1995 1 420 88.9 1 890.6 
1996 1 438 102.4 2 045.0 
1997 1 400 106.1 2 214.1 
1998 1 413 95.8 2 319.8 
1999 1 424 109.6 2 466.2 
2000 1 408 120.4 2 811.2 
2001 1 408 87.8 2 933.1 
2002 1 426 96.3 3 024.4 
2003 1 472 124.9 3 238.9 
2004 1 531 147.2 3 248.9 
2005 1 631 164.0 3 312.4 
2006 1 656 186.1 3 504.8 
2007 1 712 198.1 3 818.2 
2008 1 831 141.9 3 675.8 
2009 1 860 144.6 3 841.0 
2010 1 862 207.5 4 165.6 
2011 1 921 218.5 4 430.3 
2012 1 976 204.8 4 726.7 
2013 1 656 224.0 5 188.1 
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The general characteristics of the dataset used in this study is illustrated on a yearly basis in Table 
5 above. The variables are chosen to show the mean profitability levels and size of the chosen 
companies after winsorizing in the 1st and 99th percentile. There seems to be some fluctuation in 
the variable over time but the general trend seems to be that the generated income levels are rising 
towards the end of the chosen time period. This holds also for the average size of companies’ 
balance sheet as the yearly average of total assets rises towards the end of the time period as well. 
The economic downturns seem also to drive the data as during these distressed periods, both the 
general profitability and size of companies’ balance sheet seems to be highly fluctuate. 
 
4.2. Methodology 
In this section, I present a summary of the different methods employed in this study. Due to the 
several steps contributing to the final statistical models, I will go through the underlying models 
and the reasoning behind choosing the in question model over other available models. First, I go 
through the earnings forecast model that is required to create firm-level earnings forecasts to be 
able discard the more biased earnings forecasts of company analysts. Second, I show the reasoning 
behind the choice of certain valuation models to solve for the cost capital used as the discount rate 
in the models. After explaining the reasoning for these choices, I go through each of the models in 
more detail. Third, I introduce the statistical models that the solved cost of capital estimates are 
applied to in order to see whether companies do time their capital raising to the time periods when 
the form of capital in question is cheaper in relation to the other forms and, thus creates additional 
value for the company in terms of lower capital expenses. 
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4.2.1. Earnings forecast model  
In this section, I present a summary of the different methods employed in this study. In calculating 
the ICC measures, this study follows the earnings estimation approach established in Hou, Van 
Dijk, and Zhang (2012) and Lee, So, and Wang (2010). The main difference and advantage of this 
model over other models used in the prior literature is that rather than using analysts’ forecasts of 
earnings, this approach is based on a pooled cross-sectional earnings forecasting model. The 
proposed model also differs from the cross-sectional models that are commonly used in prior 
studies (e.g. Fama and French, 2000) by equating the earnings forecasts in dollars and not in 
Figure 2: Process to calculate the statistical models chosen 
Figure 2 shows the process of acquiring all the relevant variables to test the hypothesis. 
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profitability (dollar earnings scaled by total assets). To be able to control for extremely high 
income levels in the sample, the data is, as described above, winsorized.  
The following model is being estimated for each individual year, for each individual company in 
the dataset, using the past 10 years of observations of selected variables (minimum of 6 years): 
𝐸𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1   
where 𝐸𝑖,𝑡+1 denotes the earnings before extraordinary items of firm i in year t + 1, and all 
explanatory variables are measured at the end of year t: 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the total assets, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the dividend 
to common shareholders, 𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals 0 if 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is positive and 1 
otherwise, 𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firms with negative earnings before 
extraordinary items and 0 otherwise, and 𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is total accruals. Prior to 1988, I will be using the 
so-called balance sheet method to calculate accruals. The balance sheet method calculates the 
accruals as the change in non-cash current assets less the change in current liabilities excluding the 
change in short-term debt and the change in taxes payable minus depreciation and amortization 
expense. From 1988 onwards, I will be applying the cash flow statement method where the 
accruals are calculated as the difference between earnings and cash flows from operations. 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is 
the earnings before extraordinary items for firm i in year t. I will be using winsorizing at the 1st 
and 99th percentile to mitigate the effect of outlier observations. 
The earnings estimates are computed for each firm i and each year t in the sample by multiplying 
the independent variables as of year t with the regression coefficients from the pooled regression 
computed from the 10 year period of observations. Companies with missing variable values are 
excluded from the sample in order to keep the estimates robust. These earnings estimates are then 
applied to the valuation models described in the coming section to solve for the cost of capital. 
 
4.2.2. Valuation models applied to derive the implied cost of capital 
After computing the earnings forecasts for t + 1, these figures are employed in three different 
valuation models to solve for the discount rate or the so called implied cost of capital (R). In this 
paper, I will use the following three commonly used models: CT (based on Claus and Thomas 
(2001)), MPEG (Easton (2004)) and Gordon (Gordon and Gordon (1997). The chosen three 
(1) 
32 
 
 
models are chosen to represent all commonly used valuation method categories that are used to 
solve for ICC.  
 
Table 6: Chosen Valuation Models and Valuation Method Categories 
The wide categories for the commonly used valuation methods used in solving for the implied cost of 
capital. Categories are chosen based on the underlying valuation model that is applied in the specified 
method in question. For instance, CT and GLC are both based on the idea of valuation based on residual 
income accounting but differ in such specifications as terminal year accounting and number of years data 
required. The chosen valuation models for this study are presented as bolded in the table. There are several 
modification of these models and to further specify the exact chosen models, a more in detail description is 
provided after this table. 
Residual Income Valuation 
Abnormal Earnings Growth-
Based Valuation 
Gordon Growth Model 
Valuation 
Claus & Thomas (CT) 
Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth 
(OJ) 
Gordon 
Gebhardt, Lee & 
Swaminathan (GLS) 
Modified Price-Earnings 
Growth (MPEG) 
 
 
Residual income model (CT) 
The first valuation model is based on the approach introduced by Claus and Thomas (2001). This 
so called CT model is based on cash flow forecasts up to a terminal period and the determination 
of a terminal valued at the terminal period that captures the residual valued reaching beyond the 
terminal period. The model is implemented as follows: 
 
𝑀𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡 + ∑
𝐸𝑡[(𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+𝑘 − 𝑅) × 𝐵𝑡+𝑘−1]
(1 + 𝑅)𝑘
+
𝐸𝑡[(𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+5 − 𝑅) × 𝐵𝑡+4](1 + 𝑔)
(𝑅 − 𝑔) × (1 + 𝑅)5
5
𝑘=1
  
where 𝑀𝑡 is the market equity in year t, 𝑅 is the implied cost of capital measure, 𝐵𝑡 is the book 
equity, 𝐸𝑡[] denotes market expectations based on information available in year t, and (𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+𝑘 −
𝑅) × 𝐵𝑡+𝑘−1 is the residual income in year t+k, defined as the difference between the return on 
book equity and the ICC multiplied by the book equity in the previous year. I estimate the expected 
(2) 
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𝑅𝑂𝐸 in years t+1 to t+3 using the model-based forecasts and book equity. Book equity is 
determined based on clean surplus accounting (𝐵𝑡+𝑘 = 𝐵𝑡+𝑘−1 + 𝐸𝑡+𝑘 – 𝐷𝑡+𝑘, where 𝐸𝑡+𝑘 is the 
earnings in year t+k,  𝐷𝑡+𝑘 is the dividend in year t+k, computed using the historical dividend 
payout ratio). 
 
Abnormal Earnings Growth model (MPEG) 
The final model applied is based on the abnormal earnings growth model initially proposed by 
Easton (2004). In this paper I will apply a special case of the general model with T=2 and D = 0. 
The implied cost of capital is solved from the following equation:  
𝑅 =  √(𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+2 − 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1) / 𝑀𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+𝑖 (where i = 1 or 2) is the return on book equity in year t + i computed using the 
forecasted earnings forecasts and book equity of each single firm. 𝑅 is the implied cost of capital 
measure and 𝑀𝑡 is the market value of the company in year t. 
 
Gordon growth models (GGM) 
The second category of models, namely Gordon growth models, is based on the work of Gordon 
and Gordon (1997). In their model the firm value (𝑀𝑡) is defined as the present value of expected 
returns. The models differ from each other based on the time period used in each model. I will be 
using EPR, that is a Gordon growth model with T=1. The model is structured as follows: 
𝑀𝑡 =  
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1
(1 + 𝑅)
 
where 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1 is the return on book equity in year t+1 computed using the forecasted earnings 
forecasts and book equity for each single firm. 𝑅 is the implied cost of capital measure and 𝑀𝑡 is 
the market value of the company in year t. 
To get a better understanding on how well these different measures of ICC move through the 
chosen time period, I have constructed a graph where the co-movements become visible. Figure 3 
shows how each of the cost of capital estimate move. It is clearly observable that the estimates 
(4) 
(3) 
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gotten as products of the above described models do move quite similarly. There are major 
movements in each of the cost of capital measures during the late 1970s, and during the mid-2000s. 
In general, it seems that outside the late 1970s, the residual income model (CT) seems to be the 
least volatile measure as during the whole sample period the standard deviation of the measure is 
around 0.008. The most volatile estimates are produced by the Gordon growth model with a 
standard deviation over the sample period of 0.035. The abnormal earnings growth model (MPEG) 
experiences a standard deviation of 0.013 during the same period of time. 
 
Figure 3: Co-movements of the different ICC estimates through time 
Figure 3 shows the yearly movements of the Implied Cost of Capital estimates, calculated with the three 
different models explained above, Gordon growth model (Gordon), Residual income model (CT) and 
Abnormal Earnings Growth model (MPEG). 
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4.2.3. Models to test capital structure theories 
In this section I present the statistical models and the variables that are being used to test i) static 
trade-off theory, ii) pecking order theory and iii) market timing theory. I start by following the 
methodology presented by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) to estimate the pecking order slope 
coefficient for each year to see how the historical coefficient has changed within the set sampling 
period. To do this, I compute: 
∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,  
where ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the net debt issued for firm i in year t, and 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is the financing deficit of firm i 
in year t. Both of the variables are scaled by total assets. Here the estimated slope coefficient, 𝛽1̂, 
represents the value that is better known as the pecking order slope coefficient.  
In order to further investigate the effects of market conditions on the financing decisions made by 
companies, I focus on the positive financing deficits by pooling the firm years and computing: 
∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛽2 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑆𝑃𝑡−1 + 
𝛽6𝑇𝑆𝑃𝑡−1 +  𝛽7𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡) × 𝑃𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
where 𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is equal to 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 if 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 < 0 and zero otherwise, 𝑃𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is equal to 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 if 
𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 > 0 and zero otherwise, 𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑡−1 is the computed implied market equity risk premium at the 
end of year t-1, 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 is the expected real interest rate at the end of year t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑃𝑡−1 is the default 
spread at the end of year t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑃𝑡−1 is the term spread at the end of year t-1, 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑅𝑡 is the statutory 
corporate tax rate during year t, and 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 is the real GDP growth rate during year t. 
To make the applied statistical methods clearer and easier to understand, I will next go through the 
used independent variables in more detail. In the following sub-sections, the calculation methods 
and rationale behind each variable is explained and in the end of this part, a summary table will be 
provided to illustrate general information collectively about the chosen datasets. 
 
Financing deficit variables 
In both of the models described above I apply a measure of firm-specific yearly net financing 
deficit as an independent variable. The idea of a financing deficit is further developed in the second 
(5) 
(6) 
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regression, where the independent variable of net financing deficit is divided into two separate 
variable to account for both negative and positive deficit separately. The basic idea behind 
researching these variables comes from the simple thought that when firm’s internal cash flows 
are inadequate for the company to finance its real investments requires and/or to meet its dividend 
commitments, the company has to find external financing solutions (Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 
1999). Here the company has to make a decision on what securities to issue, debt, equity or both. 
The traditional pecking order, for instance, suggests that in these situations, the company issues 
debt and only issue equity when the debt financing is extremely costly and the cost of financial 
distress is high. 
The financing deficit is calculated as shown by Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999), 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 
∆𝐸𝑖,𝑡, where ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is defined as the change in debt and preferred stock from year t-1 to year t as a 
percentage of beginning of the year assets for company i, and ∆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is defined as the change in 
equity and convertible debt minus the change in retained earnings as a percentage of beginning of 
the year assets. Negative financing deficit variable, 𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡, used in the second regression, is 
defined to equal 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 when 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is negative and zero otherwise. Positive financing deficit 
variable, 𝑃𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡, used in the second regression, on the other hand is defined to equal 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 when 
𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is positive and zero otherwise. 
The traditional pecking order is one implication of the Myers–Majluf (1984) analysis on how 
investments and financing decisions are affected by asymmetric information. The main two results 
of the analysis lead into the conclusion that a broader concept of the pecking order hypothesis 
would accommodate some equity issuance by these companies. According to Myers-Majluf (1984) 
these equity issuances are due to of increased financial distress forcing the companies to use other 
sources of financing than debt. Thus, a company may try to finance its real investments or 
repayment of debt with equity if managers’ information at hand is sufficiently favorable and the 
issue price of an equity issuance is low enough.  
The reasoning by Myers-Majluf works also in reverse when the financing deficit represents a 
surplus (𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is positive). In these situations the company may want hold on to the excess cash 
or it may want to return cash to the investors by paying the investors cash dividend, by 
repurchasing shares, or by paying down the debt. If there are tax or other such costs of holding 
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excess cash or paying cash dividends, the company may want to consider repurchases or paying 
down the debt. Less optimistic company managers prefer paying down debt rather than 
repurchasing shares with that they see to be too highly valued. The managers that are more 
optimistic, and inclined to repurchase shares, force up their stock prices if they try to repurchase. 
Faced with these ever rising prices, the number of optimistic managers decreases and the impact 
of attempted repurchase on stock prices increases. Thus, if information asymmetries are the only 
imperfection in the market, the repurchase price should be significantly too high for managers to 
repurchase stock and therefore end up paying down their existing debt. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that pecking order’s predictability does not depend on the sign of the variable 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡. 
 
Equity risk premium and the real interest rate 
As described above, I have constructed an estimate for the equity risk premium using the computed 
implied cost of capital measures acquired using the forecasted earnings estimates. The idea behind 
estimating an equity risk premium is to capture the additional return requirements that equity 
investments face generally in the market. Riskier investments, in this case equity financing, should 
face higher expected returns than safer investment vehicles like debt of an unstressed company. 
Thus, the overall required rate of return can be thought as a sum of the risk free rate and an 
additional, extra return to compensate for the riskiness of such an investment. Therefore, I calculate 
the yearly equity risk premium by subtracting the real risk free rate from the computed cost of 
capital estimates for each firm i. The nominal risk free rate is calculated using the annualized 
nominal rate of return on one month T-bills published by U.S. Department of the Treasury. In 
order to convert the nominal risk free rate into real interest rate, I use the U.S. GDP deflator as 
published for each year by The World Bank. 
In Figure 4, the real interest rate and the implied equity risk premium are presented for each year 
in the dataset. As it can be seen from the graph, the equity risk premium fluctuates substantially 
through the whole selected time span. The time-variant nature of the equity risk premium is mainly 
due two reasons, either due the so-called rational reasons or the so-called irrational reasons. 
Rational reasons can be seen as a denominator for such phenomenon as time-variation in the risk 
or in the risk aversion of investors. Investor sentiment and the experienced timely variations in it, 
are regarded as the so-called irrational reasons.  
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Only by just looking at Figure 4, one can get an idea when firms, at least in theory, should issue 
certain securities and when they should issue other. When the equity risk premium is high, 
companies should be, on average, issuing less equity. Furthermore, the combination of high price 
on equity financing and requirement of external financing lead into issuing cheaper debt financing 
instruments. This applies also vice versa. This phenomena is visible from Figure 2, the two 
measures, equity risk premium and real interest rate, are in general negatively correlated and 
usually move in the opposite directions. 
Historically the equity risk premium has been high from the mid-1970s to the beginning of the 
1980s. During this period, from 1974 to 1979 the equity risk premium averaged around 8.3 %.   
After this, the premium fell close to zero and remained low until the early 1990s when the premium 
began to rise incrementally. From 1980 to 1990, the average equity risk premium was only around 
2.5 %, considerably lower when compared to the prior period. There has been a rising trend in the 
equity risk premium during late 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century with a major drop 
during the most recent financial crisis (3.1 % in 2007), but the premium bounced back swiftly after 
the initial drop. The average equity risk premium from 1974 to 2013 has been 4.8 % with the 
median premium at 4.2 %. Based on my analysis, the firm-level equity risk premium average has 
never fell below zero and become negative. This is in contrast to the results by Huang and Ritter 
(2009) who find that the historical equity risk premium was negative during the period from 1996 
to 2001. But as previously discussed, their model in estimating this figure differs substantially 
from my methodology. They also state in their work they might have overstated the downtrend of 
the premium during this period because of their model’s setup. 
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Figure 4: Implied Equity Risk Premium and Real Interest Rate 
Figure 4 shows the yearly movements of the Implied Equity Risk Premium, calculated from the implied 
cost of capital measure, and the Real Interest Rate, calculated from the one year T-Bills. The data is recorded 
for the whole period from 1974 to 2013. 
 
 
 
 
Default and term spread 
As laid down by the prior research (see. Baker, Greenwood, & Wurgler, 2003; Huang & Ritter, 
2009), I will apply default and term spreads in my regression model as proxies for the different 
costs faced by different forms of debt financing available for companies. As these measures are 
time-variant, they may explain some parts of the time-varying financing decisions made by 
individual companies. In this paper, I have calculated the default spread as the difference in yields 
between the corporate bonds assigned with a Baa and Aaa ratings by Moody’s as recorded in the 
Bloomberg database. The term spread is calculated here as the difference in yields between 10-
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year and one-year U.S. Treasuries as recorded in the Bloomberg database. Term spread should 
capture the attractiveness of issuing long term debt securities when the term spread is historically 
at low levels. 
 
Statutory tax rate and real GDP growth rate 
The above described model also includes the historical statutory tax rate in the U.S. and the real 
growth rate of the U.S. GDP as independent variables. The statutory tax rate is an interesting and 
important variable to the model since the corporate tax rate may have major influence on how 
companies finance their operations. As previously discussed in the literate review, the tax rate and 
tax shield on debt are key players in the world of Modigliani and Miller. Companies take into 
account the tax shield received from debt financing resulting in deductibility of interest payments 
from company’s income as they are planning on how to finance their operations. As highly 
leveraged firms face increased financial distress, the tax shield cannot be fully employed. 
Nevertheless, taxation should play at least some role in the financing decisions made by 
corporations. 
The real growth rate of the U.S. GDP is included as an independent variable in the regression in 
order to control for growth opportunities along with the growing economy. The interaction of GDP 
and the positive financing deficit (financing surplus) tells us about how the companies on average 
finance their growth opportunities as the economy as a whole grows and offers additional 
possibilities. The real GDP is calculated by using the data provided by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, Department of Commerce. 
The summary statistics of each variable presented here and their correlations with each other are 
presented in the above table, Table 7. The statistics show that the implied equity risk premium is 
positively correlated with the default spread, term spread and statutory tax rate. In contrast, the 
implied equity risk premium is negatively correlated with the real interest and the real growth rate 
of the GDP. 
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Table 7: Summary statistics of the main independent regression variables 
ERP is the implied market equity risk premium, estimated using the composite implied cost of capital index 
that employs the model based earnings forecasts computed from the accounting data available from the 
Compustat database. RIR is the nominal interest rate minus realized inflation, where the nominal interest 
rate is the yield on one-year T-bills in the secondary market, and inflation is the rate of change of the 
consumer price index. DSP is the default spread, defined as the difference in yields (weekly series) between 
Moody’s Baa rated and Aaa rated corporate bonds. TSP is the term spread, defined as the difference in 
yields (daily series) between 10 year and one year constant maturity Treasuries. TAXR is the statutory 
corporate tax rate. RGDP is the real GDP growth rate from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department 
of Commerce. 
 
 ERP RIR DSP TSP TAXR RGDP 
N 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Mean 0.048 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.426 0.027 
Std Dev 0.025 0.026 0.006 0.010 0.047 0.021 
Min 0.010 -0.030 0.006 -0.005 0.386 -0.027 
Median 0.042 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.394 0.030 
Max 0.100 0.066 0.034 0.034 0.498 0.072 
 
Correlation 
      
ERP 1      
RIR -0.847 1     
DSP 0.077 -0.078 1    
TSP 0.056 -0.078 0.140 1   
TAXR 0.040 0.231 0.422 -0.035 1  
RGDP -0.275 0.388 -0.512 -0.339 0.090 1 
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5. Results 
The results section is divided into 2 main sub-sections. First I will go through the results related to 
the traditional Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) model. Second, I go deeper to this model by 
dividing the independent regression variable of financial deficit into two parts, namely negative 
and positive deficit, and add the estimate for implied equity risk premium as well as additional 
controlling variables. Third, I will divide the whole time series into shorter time spans to see 
whether the effect of implied equity risk premium has significantly changed over time, and to 
verify the results of Huang and Ritter (2009) using similar time period. In addition, I will show 
how the effect has evolved after the testing period applied by Huang and Ritter. 
  
5.1. Results on the traditional pecking order test 
In this section, I will go through the results related to the traditional pecking order test introduced 
by Shyam-Sunder and Myers in their prior research. In this test, the regression coefficient for 
financial deficit is also called the pecking order coefficient. According to the strict pecking order 
model, this coefficient should equal one, or at least be very close to it. The results for this test are 
presented in Figure 5. 
A certain trend is clearly visible from Figure 5 and Table 8, as the pecking order slope coefficient 
significantly decreases over the whole time period from 1975 to 2013. A similar trend has been 
found by Huang and Ritter (2009), Frank and Goyal (2003) as well as Fama and French (2011). 
They all find in their research that the general trend of the slope coefficient has been downward 
facing and that the traditional pecking order theory has lost some of its power to explain how the 
companies finance their real investments. As earlier discussed, Fama and French (2011) also find 
that the general level of issuing new equity capital has been increasing.  In the beginning of the of 
the period, the slope coefficient reached its maximum value of 0.923 in 1977 and was on average 
above 0.8 during the second half of the 1970s. Also the measure for the model’s general fit to the 
observed data, namely R squared, was at high levels during this time, reaching levels close to 0.9 
with maximum in 1978 of 0.937. During the 1980s, the slope coefficient continued to decreased 
and averaged only at 0.672, significantly lower than during the second half of 1970s. The slope 
coefficient continued decreasing during the 1990s averaging around 0.526. During the 1990s, the 
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slope coefficient faced significant deviations as the within-the-decade standard deviation equaled 
around 0.11 (0.06 during the 1980s). 
Figure 5: Results from the Traditional Pecking Order Regression Formula 
Figure 5 shows the yearly movements of the regression coefficients from the traditional pecking order test 
by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (2009). Pecking order coefficient is the regression coefficient β for financial 
deficit, previously noted as DEF. Constant is the constant term, α, from a the regression. R squared is the 
annual estimate on how well the actual data fits the statistical model created. 
 
 
 
The 21st century has been also a period of decrease in the slope coefficient but the pace has slowed 
down during this period. The lowest point is also, at the same time, the most recent point in the 
dataset, as the slope coefficient in 2013 equaled 0.253. When comparing the maximum level in 
1978 and the lowest point in 2013, a total proportional decrease of a staggering negative 72.6 % 
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can be observed. This leads into a CAGR (compound annual growth rate) of -3.5%, meaning that 
on average, the slope coefficient has decreased by 3.5% a year during the recorded period of time. 
As predicted by the traditional pecking order theory, the intercept term has remained at the same 
levels, close to zero. As the traditional pecking order theory predicts the slope coefficient to be 
close to one, it can be see that its explanatory power over the companies’ financing decisions has 
decreased over time. 
 
Table 8: Pecking order slope coefficient during 10 year time buckets 
Slope coefficient is the regression coefficient from the Shyam-Sunder and Myers traditional pecking order 
regression.  
 
 1975-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2013 
Slope coefficient 0.864 0.672 0.526 0.318 0.266 
Std Dev 0.065 0.057 0.105 0.060 0.014 
 
When comparing Table 8 and Figure 5, the general trend is visible, but at the same time there 
exists some fluctuations within decades themselves which cannot be explained by the general trend 
itself. As there are ups and downs within decades, and the frequency, as well as the magnitude of 
these changes varies, this phenomenon could be interpreted as a result of changing environment in 
the relative cost of capital. In the next section, I will introduce additional independent variables to 
the traditional pecking order regression formula and, at the same time, divide the financial deficit 
variable into two separate variables, namely negative and positive deficit. This modification of the 
formula helps to understand the underlying forces that might be driving the companies’ behavior 
when making decisions on what securities to issue. 
In addition, I have tested the general robustness of the underlying model by visually examining 
the observations in the sample, not for one year, but for four years in order to see if they also 
exhibit the same deterioration than the initial statistical model. In order to do this, I have conducted 
a deep dive into the pecking order slope coefficient and its deterioration over the selected time 
span. To visualize this, I have prepared four separate scatter plots to be treated as visual robustness 
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checks. Figure 6 shows scatter plots for four selected years, namely 1977, 1990, 2000 and 2010. 
All the others but 1977 were chosen as random, with enough time between each other. Year 1977 
was chosen due to pecking order slope coefficient peaking during this time. I have also drawn a 
hypothetical 45-degree line in each of the graphs as this represents the financing behavior proposed 
by the pecking order theory. Thus, if the traditional pecking order theory would dictate, all the 
observation points would lie on this 45 degree line. 
To better understand the scatter plot graphs and to be able to interpret the pattern I will offer a brief 
explanation on the graph’s background next. As predicted by the pecking order theory, the 
company will use debt as the external source for financing its deficits. Thus, if a company should 
finance 100% of its financing deficit with net debt, all of the observation points in the scatter plot 
would lie on the graphed 45-degree line. If a company would have negative net equity issuance, it 
would lie on the left side from the 45-degree line. In contrast, a company with positive net equity 
issuance would lie on the right side of the graphed 45-degree line.  
In contrast to the predicted outcome hypothesized by the pecking order theory, it is observable that 
the observations do not lie on this graphed 45-degree line. Furthermore, when looking at all the 
four scatter plots, a certain pattern can be observed as the observation points seem to be less tightly 
grouped around the 45-degree line when moving away from the situation in 1977. When 
comparing 2010 to 1977, a much more scattered group can be observed around the 45-degree line.  
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Figure 6: Net debt and net external financing scatter plots for selected four years as visual 
robustness check 
In each of the presented scatter plot figures the horizontal axis denotes net external financing and the vertical 
axis denotes net debt. Both of the measures are scaled by beginning-of-the-year assets. The 45 degree line 
is hypothetical and represents the state implied by the traditional pecking order theory.  
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5.2. Results on the expanded regression model 
In this section, the results for the expanded regression models are presented. I will first go through 
the partly expanded model, with the divided financing deficit variable (positive and negative 
deficit) and the equity risk premium as the only macroeconomic independent variable. Second, I 
will go through the fully expanded model with additional macroeconomic variables to see what 
happens when certain variables are controlled for, and how these variables affect the companies’ 
financing decisions as a whole. 
I have presented the results for the partly expanded regression model in Table 9, where the actual 
coefficient, t-stat, model fit (R2) and number of observations are visible. As expected, both the 
negative and positive deficit variables have positive sign that is consistent with the traditional 
regression model. Also the sign for the interaction between the positive financing deficit and the 
implied firm-level equity risk premium is positive granting power to the market timing theory. 
This effect is also highly significant statistically. The positive sign in the interaction of the positive 
financing deficit and the equity risk premium implies that as the relative cost of equity financing 
increase, the company prefers debt. This notion works also vice versa, when the relative cost of 
equity is low, companies tend to prefer equity instruments over debt.  
In economic terms, if the equity risk premium is to go up by one unit (one percentage point), the 
change would be associated with 0.998% more of the financing deficit being finance with debt 
securities issuances (for instance from 60% to 62.47%). The recorded economic impact is smaller 
than the results recorded by Huang and Ritter (2009) and Elliott, Koeter-Kant and Warr (2007) 
who find that a change of one unit in the equity risk premium (one percentage point) is associated 
with 2.9 percentage point change in the financing behavior. As earlier discussed, their calculation 
method of equity risk premium only creates market-level estimates that do not account for firm-
level variables. Thus, it seems that the market-level changes in the equity risk premium have a 
larger impact on the financing decisions made by individual companies than the change in the 
firm-level equity risk premium. This result is in contrast to my fourth hypothesis that assumes 
firm-level changes to affect the financing behavior more the market-level changes. I will discuss 
this result in the coming concluding section in more detail. 
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Table 9: Results for the partly expanded regression tests 
In Table 9, the following equation is estimated: ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛽2 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑡−1) × 𝑃𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡. In Table 5, the financing deficit, DEFit, is defined as the sum of ΔDit and ΔEit , where ΔDit is the change 
in debt and preferred stock from year t-1 to year t as a percentage of beginning of year assets for firm i, and 
ΔEit is the change in equity and convertible debt minus the change in retained earnings as a percentage of 
beginning of year assets. In the table, NDEFit equals DEFit if the deficit is negative and zero otherwise. 
PDEFit equals DEFit if the deficit is positive and zero otherwise. ERPt-1 is the implied firm-level equity risk 
premium at the end of year t-1. The implied firm-level equity risk premium macroeconomic variables are 
measured in decimal form (i.e., a 5% equity risk premium is measured as 0.05). Both the dependent variable 
and the financing deficit are measured as percentages. 
 
 1975–2013 
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
NDEF 0.086 48.26 
PDEF 0.167 232.47 
ERP × PDEF 0.998 151.59 
Constant 0.011 1.95 
   
Adj. R2 0.715  
N 46 343  
 
 
In order to study whether the importance of the firm-level equity risk premium to companies’ 
funding decisions has changed over time, I have constructed additional two separate regression for 
time periods from 1974 to 2001, and from 2002 to 2013. These regressions are both presented in 
Table 10 with the corresponding regression coefficients, t-stats, adjusted R2 and number of 
observations. It is visible from these time buckets that the sign in the interaction between the firm-
level implied equity risk premium and financing deficit is positive and the effect is statistically 
significant. Furthermore, the signs and significances of each independent variable seem not to be 
changing notably. What is noteworthy here, is the increase of the coefficient in the interaction of 
the firm-level implied equity risk premium and the financing deficit. During the time period from 
1975 to 2001, the regressions coefficient was notably lower than it was during the time period 
from 2002 to 2013. This difference is also economically significant when moving from 0.105 to 
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1.004. The increase in the coefficient could indicate towards a rise in the relative importance of 
the cost of certain capital and, thus could be interpreted as support for the market timing theory 
and its growing relevance in explaining how the capital structure of firms is actually constructed. 
This phenomenon needs to be studied in more detail in order to understand it better and draw more 
precise conclusions on whether the importance of such measures has increased during the past 
decades. 
 
Table 10: Partly expanded regressions during different time buckets 
In Table 10, the following equation is estimated: ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛽2 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑡−1) ×
𝑃𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. In Table 10, the financing deficit, DEFit, is defined as the sum of ΔDit and ΔEit , where ΔDit 
is the change in debt and preferred stock from year t-1 to year t as a percentage of beginning of year assets 
for firm i, and ΔEit is the change in equity and convertible debt minus the change in retained earnings as a 
percentage of beginning of year assets. In the table, NDEFit equals DEFit if the deficit is negative and zero 
otherwise. PDEFit equals DEFit if the deficit is positive and zero otherwise. ERPt-1 is the implied firm-level 
equity risk premium at the end of year t-1. The implied firm-level equity risk premium macroeconomic 
variables are measured in decimal form (i.e., a 5% equity risk premium is measured as 0.05). Both the 
dependent variable and the financing deficit are measured as percentages. The regression if executed on for 
two separate time periods, from 1975 to 2001, and 2002 to 2013 in order to see if the importance of the 
firm-level implied equity risk premium has changed. 
 
 1975–2001 2002-2013 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
NDEF 0.680 84.83 0.085 30.91 
PDEF 0.593 191.84 0.166 150.70 
ERP × PDEF 0.105 3.19 1.004 99.52 
Constant 0.003 1.85 -0.021 -1.49 
     
Adj. R2 0.621  0.725  
N 27 669  18 674  
 
In Table 11, additional macroeconomic variables (the real interest rate, default spread, term spread, 
statutory tax rate and the real growth rate of the GDP in the U.S.) are added to the regression model 
to control for certain movements in the market and also to get a better understanding on how the 
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financing decisions are made as a whole. It is visible form Table 11 that the coefficient on the 
interaction between positive financing deficit and implied firm-level equity risk premium changes 
only by little after controlling for the additional macroeconomic variables, namely the real interest 
rate, default spread, term spread, statutory tax rate and the real growth rate of GDP. Also the 
statistical significance remains at high levels.  
Table 11 shows also that an increase in the statutory tax rate leads into firms funding their financing 
deficits with higher amount of debt, which is consistent with the hypothesis of the trade-off theory 
that states that companies will try to benefit from the tax shield created by interest payments on 
debt. As companies face an increased taxation environment, they will try to benefit from this by 
issuing more debt securities. The tax rate in my data set is the statutory tax rate and it is used as a 
macroeconomic variable that is not firm specific but same for all of the companies. The tax rate 
was set as a macroeconomic variable due to the fact that all of the companies are U.S.-based 
publicly listed companies that should, more or less, share same sort of taxation environment. In 
addition to the previous point, the same approach has been employed in the prior research (see. 
Huang and Ritter, 2009), and in order to make the results more comparable I will be using the 
same fundamental setting in the main tests.   
At the same time, the coefficient seems to be positive on the interaction between positive financing 
deficit and the real growth rate of GDP. This is in line with the prior research suggesting that firms, 
on average, seem to finance their growth opportunities with debt rather than equity. Thus, in 
addition to the results from the interaction between the statutory tax rate and the positive deficit, 
this somewhat give support to the traditional trade-off theory. While this may be the case, the 
regression coefficient on the interaction is not statistically significant. 
The regression models presented in this section do share their advantages and disadvantages. One 
of the most important advantage of these regressions models is the fact that they are able to analyze 
a large number of companies over a long period of time. In addition, they allow for controlling for 
several factors, in this case macroeconomic variables such as spreads and GDP growth rate. One 
of the biggest disadvantages is the relatively large reaction to outliers that need to be extremely 
carefully controlled for and the data has to be correctly setup at all the required steps during the 
regressions analyses. 
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Table 11: Results of the expanded regression model 
In Table 6, the following equation is estimated: ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛽2 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑡−1 +
𝛽4𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑆𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑆𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡) × 𝑃𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. In Table 6, the financing 
deficit, DEFit, is defined as the sum of ΔDit and ΔEit , where ΔDit is the change in debt and preferred stock 
from year t-1 to year t as a percentage of beginning of year assets for firm i, and ΔEit is the change in equity 
and convertible debt minus the change in retained earnings as a percentage of beginning of year assets. In 
the table, NDEFit equals DEFit if the deficit is negative and zero otherwise. PDEFit equals DEFit if the deficit 
is positive and zero otherwise. ERPt-1 is the implied firm-level equity risk premium at the end of year t-1. 
RIRt-1 is the nominal interest rate minus inflation in year t. DSPt-1 is the default spread, defined as the 
difference in yields between Moody’s Baa rated and Aaa rated corporate bonds at the end of year t-1 as 
noted in the Bloomberg database. TSPt-1 is the term spread, defined as the difference in yields (daily series) 
between 10 year and one year constant maturity T-bills at the end of year t-1. TAXRt is the statutory 
corporate tax rate during year t. RGDPt is the real GDP growth rate during year t. All of the macroeconomic 
variables are measured in decimal form (i.e., a 5% equity risk premium is measured as 0.05). Both the 
dependent variable and the financing deficit are measured as percentages. 
 
 1975–2013 
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
NDEF 0.086 48.51 
PDEF 0.176 207.04 
ERP × PDEF 0.912 114.82 
RIR × PDEF -4.088 -20.85 
DSP × PDEF -10.970 -3.11 
TSP × PDEF -23.016 -10.88 
TAXR × PDEF 1.307 6.20 
RGDP × PDEF 1.118 0.83 
Constant -0.000 -0.04 
   
Adj. R2 0.719  
N 46 309  
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6. Conclusion 
 
The main goal of this paper was to gain better understanding on the decision variables that affect 
a company’s financing decisions. I find that the cost, implied by the capital markets for a single 
firm, is a key decision variable when making capital structuring decisions. However, the overall 
state of the market reflected by the market-level implied costs affects the management’s decisions 
even more. In addition to the cost levels, tax rate has an important role as predicted by the trade-
off theory. It also seems that the pecking order theory has lost most of its explanatory power over 
companies’ security issuance behavior during the last few decades. 
The time variant nature of security issuances offer a perfect setting to study the hypothesized world 
implied by these theories, and in order to understand companies’ behavior on firm-level, more than 
just market wide macro variables are required. As new methodology of calculating the cost of 
capital has risen in the field of finance and accounting, this is the perfect time to sharpen our 
expectations based on these theories and study certain phenomena from a different angle. In my 
study this new angle is to look at the cost of capital as a firm-level variable that takes into account 
the unique characteristics of a given company and is not only a macroeconomic estimate shedding 
light on market wide events and trends. As stated in one of my hypothesis, I do not expect the 
effect to disappear when moving from market-level to firm-level. I was expecting a clear reaction 
by the companies’ management on the fluctuations in the cost of capital and was also expecting, 
contrary to the traditional trade-off theory, that the companies would be issuing equity more 
frequently than just as a last resort when the company is already financially distressed. 
Using the computed implied cost of capital estimates to come up with an estimate for firm-level 
equity risk premium, I find that the companies’ managers do follow the fluctuations in the relative 
cost of capital and seek to finance their operations with equity when equity financing is relatively 
cheaper. This, of course, works vice versa. In addition, I find that companies tend to finance their 
general growth prospects with debt capital and that the tax rate plays a key role in when making 
financing decisions. This notion about the importance of the tax rate is in line with the prior 
research and the trade-off theory. Although, trade-off theory has the tax shield effect incorporated 
as one of its main components, it still fails to explain the opportunistic behavior of companies to 
finance their operations with cheap equity and the actual frequency of issuing equity based 
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securities. Thus, the trade-off theory can be seen as an underlying component that is able to explain 
some of the aspects that the companies’ management seems to face. 
I also find that the traditional pecking order theory seems to have lost most of its explanatory 
power over the companies financing behavior. The so-called pecking order slope coefficient was 
at high levels during the second half of the 1970s but has since decreased notably. As companies’ 
management seems to be acting as an opportunistic entity when it comes to making financing 
decisions, the idea of a more-or-less universal pecking order of capital sources does not seem to 
fit the picture. Based on my results, I see pecking order theory as a simplified rule of thumb that 
fails to incorporate the management’s ability to follow the cost assigned for different classes of 
capital that the company is facing. The pecking order is more like a status quo that is broken when 
the financial environment starts to fluctuate. 
When compared to the prior research conducted by Huang and Ritter (2009), I find, contrary to 
one of my hypothesis, that although the companies’ management seems to be following the firm-
specific cost of capital levels, the economic importance of these movements is lesser than the 
movements in the market-level cost of capital. My initial hypothesis was set mainly based on the 
qualitative study conducted by Graham and Harvey (2001) where they find that company 
management uses such analytical tools to estimate their cost of capital that account for company 
specific characteristics (e.g. CAPM and historical averages). However, a further analysis of such 
models as CAPM, offer support to finding in this paper as it is essentially based on market-level 
data that is then adjusted with betas that account for firm-specific characteristics. Thus, the CAPM 
–model is fundamentally affected significantly by changes in the market-level return requirements. 
In addition, this phenomenon could exist because company management could find it easier to 
follow the general movements in the capital markets and reflect these movements on their own 
businesses. The management is faced with this information from various sources subconsciously 
and also consciously through news, market reports and discourses. Following the companies’ own 
market implied cost of equity levels can be more challenging and especially labor-consuming for 
smaller companies who do not have resources dedicated to these purposes. Thus, in the future 
research the size of the company should be used as one of the variables to see how it affects the 
general financing behavior. 
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In addition, it seems that the importance of firm-level implied equity risk premium in the financing 
decisions made by the management has been increasing. This could be a result of several different 
factor, such as technological development or the availability of data and tools to follow certain 
indicators. It would interesting to study this phenomenon in more detail in order to see how the 
importance has actually been developing. In order to study the underlying reasons for such 
behavior, it would be interesting, and at the same time very important, to conduct a survey study 
on the company management to see if something has changed in the procedures of following 
company’s own cost of capital levels. 
As the search for the underlying reasons why the economic importance of the movements in the 
implied equity risk premium differs between my paper and the paper by Huang and Ritter (2009) 
is not in the scope of this paper, I would like to see further analysis on this. In addition to this, 
although the implied cost of capital framework is still relatively new concept and the overall 
number of papers written about it is relatively low, the research is heavily concentrated on the U.S. 
based companies and the U.S. equity market. It would be extremely interesting and, at the same 
time, important to study the same phenomena in other markets like the Europe, Asia and the 
developing markets. This way more could be learned about the differences between these markets 
and whether the behavioral factors found in the U.S. based markets are also present when studying 
other capital markets. Although we are living in a globalized world and investors act not only in 
their domestic capital markets, some underlying differences in these markets might cause some 
interesting local phenomena.  
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